Islamic Conservatism and Support for Religious Freedom by Sumaktoyo, N. G. (Nathanael)
1 
 
ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM AND SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
Nathanael Gratias Sumaktoyo 
Graduate Student 
University of Notre Dame 
 
Abstract 
 The literature on the Muslim world has found that although Muslims have a high support 
for democracy, that same support has been lower when it comes to democratic virtues such as 
tolerance. It has been unclear, however, what specifically about the Muslim world that contributes 
to this paradox. I offer methodological and theoretical contributions to this scholarly discussion. 
Methodologically, I employ Bayesian item response theory (IRT) that improves the previous 
studies by relaxing the requirement that all units of analysis answer an identical set of questions. I 
present a picture of conservatism levels in 26 countries and offer an insight on the relative 
importance of social issues among Muslims across the world. On the theoretical level, I provide 
evidence that it is Islamic conservatism that leads to the tolerance deficit. This conservatism is 
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ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM AND SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
 Although early research argued that Islam is incompatible with democracy (e.g., Kedourie 
1992; Lipset 1994, 5; Huntington 1997), contemporary studies have provided evidence for the 
opposite. Support for democracy is high among Muslims and in Muslim-majority countries (e.g., 
Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Mujani and Liddle 2007, 2009; Norris and 
Inglehart 2002; Rose 2002; Tessler 2002, 2003). Muslims, just like non-Muslims, prefer a 
democratic leader to a strong leader and democracy to authoritarianism. 
 Stating that one supports democracy, however, is not the same as saying one submits to 
democratic values, among the most important being religious tolerance. In addition to (or perhaps 
more than) elections, democracy needs tolerance—a willingness of the people to put up with ideas, 
groups, or beliefs they disagree with (Gibson 2010, Linz and Stepan 1996). It is this aspect of 
democracy that studies start to show the Muslim world is lacking (e.g., Gu and Bomhoff 2012; 
Spierings 2014). Muslims support democracy, but are less willing to tolerate offensive acts, 
especially if the acts are hostile to religion (Djupe and Calfano 2012). 
In part because this line of research is new, little is known about the factors behind this 
relatively low level of tolerance. I aim to advance the literature by focusing on religious tolerance 
and by offering methodological and theoretical contributions. On the methodological level, I 
employ a modeling technique of survey response that is based on Bayesian item response theory 
(IRT). The method offers three advantages relative to the past studies. First, instead of treating 
observed survey responses as given, the method models them as influenced by an unobserved 
latent variable “Islamic conservatism.” This variable efficiently summarizes attitudes toward 
multiple issues and makes a comparison between individuals or between aggregation categories 
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easier. Second, the approach acknowledges the empirical fact that not all survey questions are 
created equal. Some may be better than the others in separating the most and least conservative 
respondents. Questions may also differ in their likelihoods to elicit affirmative responses from the 
respondents. Third, insofar as it is possible to create a common space and connect respondents 
based on the questions they answer, the method allows for a cross-countries comparison even if 
the respondents do not answer an identical set of questions. 
On the theoretical level, I argue that Islamic conservatism is the main drive behind the 
relatively low tolerance level among Muslims in the Muslim world. Islamic conservatism is 
different from social conservatism in that the former pertains to issues specifics to Islam whereas 
the latter relates to general social issues debated by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, such as 
abortion, euthanasia, and alcohol. I provide individual-level evidence that Islamic conservatism 
predicts support for religious freedom above and beyond the effects of economic condition and 
level of piety. By differentiating Islamic and general conservatism, I argue that when it comes to 
respecting rights of religious minorities in Muslim-majority countries whether Muslims have 
become more liberal in the Western sense (such as by supporting abortion or same-sex marriage) 
matters less than whether Muslims submit to a religious ethnocentrism. 
I divide the remainder of this article into six sections. In the first section, I review the 
literature on democracy and tolerance and discuss how in the Muslim world support for democratic 
values has been lower than the support for democracy as a system. The second section presents 
the argument for the need to differentiate Islamic and general social conservatisms. A section on 
Bayesian item response theory then follows. It is not meant to be technical, but rather to provide 
the reader with a broad understanding of the method. In the fourth and fifth sections, I outline the 
analytical procedures and present the results. I show how levels of Islamic conservatism vary 
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across countries and provide evidence for the predictive power of the construct on the support for 
religious freedom. Lastly, I offer discussions of the results and highlight avenues for future 
research. 
 
Democracy and Democratic Values in the Muslim World 
 Support for democracy is arguably the most researched topic when it comes to the study of 
the Muslim world. Scholars are baffled why Muslim-majority countries seem immune to waves of 
democratization. Early researchers such as Kedourie (1992) and Huntington (1997), championing 
a political culture perspective, argue that the answer to a large extent lies on Islam’s incompatibility 
with democracy. Since democracy generally requires a separation between religion and public 
affairs (Brathwaite and Bramsen 2011; Fox 2006; Philpott 2007), that Islam regulates almost every 
aspect of life makes it difficult to contain the religion from permeating the public sphere. Muslims, 
this view argues, are facing difficulties creating a rational public sphere because their religion 
already tells them everything they need to know. 
 More contemporary research, however, has casted doubts on this assertion. Instead of 
assuming what Muslims think about democracy based on what we think we know about Islam, 
contemporary research utilizes public opinion surveys to understand Muslims’ political attitudes 
based on what Muslims say about themselves. These studies consistently find that Muslims, like 
their Western or Christian counterparts, want and support democracy (e.g., Esposito and Mogahed 
2007; Gu and Bomhoff 2012; Hofmann 2004; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2002). 
The relative resistance of Muslim-majority countries to waves of democratization therefore is due 
more to institutional factors than to Islam itself. In fact, there is a paradox in that Muslims want 
5 
 
democracy more than non-Muslims but Muslim-majority countries are generally not a democracy 
(Maseland and Hoorn 2011; Rowley and Smith 2009). 
 A new generation of research expands this finding and looks into the acceptance of 
democratic values, most notably religious tolerance. Democracy requires that its citizens say “I 
do” not only to elections and the system but also to tolerance, trust, and participation (Gibson 
2010; Inglehart 2003). At the very least, these democratic virtues help making democracy work 
(Putnam 1993). Studies that look into this topic have found that the Muslim world tends to be less 
tolerant (Gu and Bomhoff 2012; Milligan, Andersen, and Brym 2014). Even in non-Muslim 
majority countries such as the United States (Djupe and Calfano 2012) or Western Europe 
(Verkuyten et al. 2014), Muslims are found to have relatively low level of tolerance. 
Unfortunately, in part because the topic is relatively understudied compared to one on Muslims’ 
support for democracy, little is known about factors that contribute to this tolerance deficit.  
What is it in the Muslim world that explains the low level of tolerance? Two perspectives 
present two plausible explanations. The modernization perspective attributes the phenomena to the 
lower economic development of Muslim-majority countries. Economic security is positively 
related to post-modernist values, such as trust and tolerance (Inglehart 1997; Norris and Inglehart 
2012). As people become more economically and existentially secure, they can devote more time 
and resources to activities that are related to self-expression, autonomy, and diversity, as opposed 
to survival and sustenance. Psychologically, the theory conforms to what we know about terror-
management (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 1986). In the face of threat, people have a 
tendency to affirm traditional moral views. Pertaining to tolerance, this affirmation of 
traditionalism may manifest itself in the rejection of “the others”. 
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 The second perspective, the cultural hypothesis, focuses the inquiry on religion. Related to 
Islam, some have argued that Islam’s theology is distinct and less amicable to democratic virtues 
than the theologies of Judeo-Christian faiths (e.g., Huntington 1997). It is more reasonable, 
however, to broaden the scope to religion in general and not limit it to Islam. Even after controlling 
for socio-economic status, religion is known to have negative consequences on tolerance (e.g., 
Gibson 2010; Putnam and Campbell 2010). That the Muslim world tends to be low in tolerance 
may be due to the fact that it has a much higher level of religiosity than the Western countries or 
even the rest of the world (Norris and Inglehart 2012; Pew Global 2008). 
 What is missing from this cultural perspective is its lack of nuance. It fails to recognize 
that religion has separate components (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Smidt and Guth 2009). At the 
very basic, there is piety or one’s level of religious practice. There are also belonging to religious 
organization, religious attitudes, and politically charged religious attitudes (Spierings 2014). These 
aspects of religiosity may have different relationships to religious tolerance and support for 
religious freedom.  
 
Separating Islamic and General Conservatism 
 I define Islamic conservatism as a preference for social norms, traditions, or orders that is 
supportive of the confluence of politics and religion consistent with traditional Islamic values (also 
see Blaydes and Linzer 2008, 577). I concur with Blaydes and Linzer (2008) in that I do not claim 
that Islamic conservatism represents the true Islam. I refrain from entering the normative debate 
about what Islam is or is not. I diverge from Blaydes and Linzer (2008) in that I intentionally limit 
the construct to pertain only to social attitudes.  
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 It is useful to distinguish Islamic conservatism from a general social conservatism and piety 
or personal religiosity. Islamic conservatism may be liked to fundamentalism or religious 
ethnocentrism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005) that is characterized by ingroup-outgroup divide 
and perceived superiority of one’s moral worldview1. More than practicing one’s belief, Islamic 
conservatism implies one’s desire to create a society that is legally and formally based on that 
belief, even at the expense of discriminating against the others. Although personal piety tends to 
go hand in hand with such conservatism (Savage and Liht 2008; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and 
Anisman 2010), they have distinct political outcomes (Ellison and Musick 1993; McFarland and 
Warren 1992). Muluk, Sumaktoyo, and Ruth (2012), for example, show that the support for 
religious violence among Indonesian Muslims is positively related to the support for Islamic laws 
and negatively to the level of one’s religious practice.  
 Islamic conservatism is also different from a general social conservatism. While the first is 
inspired by Islam or Islamic teachings, the latter is closer to a simple preference for traditional 
norms, regardless of religion. To scholars familiar with American politics, the distinction between 
                                                            
1 Throughout this article, I use the term fundamentalism primarily to connect Islamic conservatism 
to the existing bodies of research on the psychology of religion and on religion and politics. I stick 
to the term “Islamic conservatism” as opposed to “Islamic fundamentalism”, however, because the 
latter may bring an image of Muslim extremists. Since “conservatism” is widely used in political 
science, the term “Islamic conservatism” underlines an important aspect of this study: that the 
subjects are everyday people and not some militants detached from everyday social and political 
lives. These people have opinions about social issues just like voters everywhere have opinions. It 
is these opinions and their consequences that this study tries to capture. 
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the two would be best explained with a thought experiment. Imagine an American political system 
where George McGovern had not decided to appeal to the seculars in the 1972 Democratic party 
convention and the Religious Right had not been formed by conservative Republicans as a reaction 
(Layman 2001). The two parties would be still divided, possibly along the civil-rights line, but 
religion would be a less divisive issue. One party would be still more conservative than the other, 
but that conservatism would be more weakly correlated to religion than it is in reality. The kind of 
conservatism championed by the conservative party in our thought experiment would be an 
example of a general social conservatism. Admittedly, this difference may be more of a degree 
than a kind. Politicians are apt in using religious language to champion a cause (e.g., Albertson 
2014; Blaydes and Linzer 2012), which blurs the already opaque line between traditional issues 
and religious issues. To ascertain that such a distinction exists in the dataset, I employ exploratory 
factor analysis instead of confirmatory factor analysis.  
 
A Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Approach to IRT 
 Before it became popular in political science, educational psychologists had widely used 
IRT to assess the performance of test takers (e.g., Bock 1997; Lord and Novick 1968). It offers 
some advantages relative to the other methods. Relative to the traditional "count the number of 
correct responses" approach, IRT allows the researcher to empirically estimate, based on the test-
takers' performance, how difficult the questions are and adjust the test-takers' scores based on the 
difficulties of the questions they incorrectly or correctly answered. This in turn makes it possible 
to understand what issues are most strongly related to Islamic conservatism and what issues 
separate the most and least conservative respondents. 
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Another advantage of Bayesian IRT relates to the way it handles missing data. Unlike most 
methods (e.g., factor analysis) that assume the missing data is either missing completely at random 
(MCAR) or missing at random (MAR), Bayesian IRT does not require any assumption about 
missingness. It estimates the model based on whatever information is available from the 
respondents. The way missingness affects the estimates is through the estimates’ credible 
intervals2. Estimates that have fewer data will have wider credible intervals, which represent their 
greater uncertainties. Lastly, relative to latent class analysis (e.g., Blaydes and Linzer 2008), IRT 
has the advantage of producing a continuous score. This score may then be used as the independent 
or dependent variable of interest in the next step of analysis.  
In political science, applications of IRT are most widespread in the studies of American 
public opinion (e.g., Levendusky and Pope 2010; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013; Treier and 
Hillygus 2009) and ideal point estimation of legislators' or elites' ideology (e.g., Clinton, Jackman, 
and Rivers 2004; Martin and Quinn 2002). The method, however, is less widely used in 
comparative political research with the most notable exception being Treier and Jackman’s (2008) 
application of IRT on Polity data. 
 There are many IRT models, but this article employs the 1-dimensional 2-parameter 
normal-ogive model (1D-2PNO) as one of the simplest models that is robust enough to some 
violations of its assumptions (Harrison 1986; Ip 2010). Given 𝑛 respondents and 𝑘 questions, a 
respondent's answer to a question is modeled as following the probability: 
                                                            
2 Credible interval is the Bayesian term for confidence interval. There are some theoretical 
differences between the two, but for most intent and purposes they can be interpreted in the same 
way. 
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Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝜃𝑖 , 𝛽𝑗 , 𝛼𝑗) = 𝐹(βjθi − αj),    i = 1, … , n;   j = 1, … , k 
                                        = Φ(βjθi − αj) ,   i = 1, … , n;   j = 1, … , k 
(1) 
(2) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is respondent 𝑖's response on question 𝑗 ("0" if the response indicates a moderate 
religious view and "1" if indicates religious conservatism), 𝜃𝑖 is respondent 𝑖's latent trait (Islamic 
conservatism), and 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛼𝑗 are two item parameters of question 𝑗. The term “one-dimensional” 
in the model’s name refers to each respondent having only one conservatism score representing 
her conservatism level in a continuous spectrum. 𝐹(. ) is a link function translating the linear 
equation in the bracket into [0,1] probability space. The term "normal ogive" in the model name 
indicates that the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution is used as link 
function (Equation 2). 
 Parameter 𝛽𝑗 is called the discrimination parameter of question 𝑗. Technically, it indicates 
how steep the change in the probability of a correct answer is for a unit change in the latent trait. 
More practically, the coefficient signifies how well a question discriminates between, in our case, 
the most and least conservative respondents. The bigger the coefficient is, the more conservatism 
affects the likelihood of expressing an agreement to the question.  
Parameter 𝛼𝑗 is known as the difficulty parameter. It affects the likelihood of respondents 
agreeing with the question, regardless of their conservatism level. The bigger the coefficient is, the 
less likely respondents are to agree with the question. Since we may safely assume that respondents 
would be less likely to agree with extreme questions, the coefficient in turn would be of interest 
because it tells us how extreme an issue is. A Bayesian MCMC approach to estimate 𝜃, 𝛽, and 𝛼 
involves three steps: (1) specification of priors, (2) calculation of posterior density, and (3) the 
MCMC sampling itself.  
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Specification of Priors 
In general, priors represent what we know about our variables. Although priors may be 
chosen for their mathematical convenience (e.g, conjugate priors, see Gelman et al. 2004; Jackman 
2009), the priors of a normal ogive model follow the normal distribution, which have the benefit 
of being congruent with our understanding of attitudes on social issues: 
𝜃~𝑁(𝜇𝜃, 𝜎𝜃
2) (3) 
(𝛽, 𝛼)~𝑀2(𝜇𝛽,𝛼 , Σ𝛽,𝛼 ) (4) 
 
 In regard to 𝜃, we may reasonably think that Islamic conservatism follows a normal 
distribution. Few people are extremely liberal and few are extremely conservative. Most should be 
somewhere in the middle. The rationale is the same for 𝛽 and 𝛼. Most issues concerning Islam and 
society should be neither too extreme nor too liberal, but lie somewhere in the middle.  
 
Calculation of Posterior Density 
 A posterior density can be understood as the probability of having certain values of 
population parameters given actual data and the parameters’ priors. It follows straightforwardly 
from Bayes formula of proportionality: 
𝑃(𝜃, 𝛽, 𝛼|𝑌) ∝  ∏ ∏[Φ(βjθi − αj)]
𝑦𝑖𝑗
[1 − Φ(βjθi − αj)]
1−𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
     × 
                              ∏ 𝜙(𝜃; 𝜇𝜃, 𝜎𝜃
2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
        × 
                              ∏ 𝜙2(𝛽, 𝛼; 𝝁𝜷,𝜶, 𝚺𝜷,𝜶)
𝑘
𝑗=1
 
 
(5.i) 
 
 
(5.ii) 
 
(5.iii) 
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where part (i) of Equation (5) is the likelihood of 𝑛 × 𝑘 independent Bernoulli trials (see 
Equation 2), part (ii) is the prior of the latent conservatism scores of 𝑛 independent respondents, 
and part (iii) is the bivariate normal prior for the 𝛽 and 𝛼 of the 𝑘 questions. 
 
MCMC Sampling of the Posterior 
 While the two preceding steps are the Bayesian part of a Bayesian MCMC approach to 
IRT, the sampling step is the MCMC part. The basic spirit is that if it would be too hard for one to 
analytically derive quantities of interest (e.g., mean or variance) from a joint density function, one 
may be able to do it more easily by sampling from the density. That is, one obtains the quantities 
empirically through an MCMC sampling instead of analytically through mathematical derivations. 
Various sampling algorithms are available (see Gelman et al. 2004 Chapter 11), but this article 
uses the commonly employed Gibbs sampling.  
The method works on the principle that one may divide a posterior density into full 
conditionals of the components, estimate the components separately, and recover the posterior 
from the separate estimations. Following a data augmentation process, one may derive the full 
conditionals' distributions as follow (also see Albert 1992; Bazan, Bolfarine, and Leandro 2006): 
(𝑍𝑖𝑗|•) ~ {
1(𝑦𝑖𝑗=1)𝑁(𝛽𝑗𝜃𝑖 − 𝛼𝑗 , 1),   𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1
1(𝑦𝑖𝑗=0)𝑁(𝛽𝑗𝜃𝑖 − 𝛼𝑗 , 1),   𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 0
  
 
(6.i) 
(𝜃𝑖|•) ~ 𝑁 (
∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑗)
𝑘
𝑗=1
1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
2𝑘
𝑗=1
,
1
1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
2𝑘
𝑗=1
 ) 
(6.ii) 
(𝛽𝑗 , 𝛼𝑗|•) ~ 𝑀2 (𝛽𝑗 , 𝛼𝑗; [𝑋
′𝑋 + (Σ𝛽,𝛼)
−1
]
−1
[𝑋′𝑍𝑗 + (Σ𝛽,𝛼)
−1
𝜇𝛽,𝛼] , [𝑋
′𝑋 + (Σ𝛽,𝛼)
−1
]
−1
) 
     , where 𝑋 = [𝜃 −1]𝑛×2 
                    𝜇𝛽,𝛼  and Σ𝛽,𝛼  from Equation (4) 
                    𝑍𝑗 = (𝑍1𝑗 𝑍2𝑗 … 𝑍𝑛𝑗)′ 
 
(6.iii) 
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 The Gibbs sampling then proceeds straightforwardly: [1] Set initial starting values for 
𝜃, 𝛽, 𝛼; [2] Draw 𝑍 using Equation (6.i); [3] Draw new 𝜃 using Equation (6.ii); [4] Draw new 𝛽, 𝛼 
using Equation (6.iii); and [5] Repeat steps 2 to 4 as many as the desired number of iterations using 
the most recent values of 𝜃, 𝛽, 𝛼. 
 Before proceeding to the analysis, it is useful to briefly discuss how the method relaxes the 
requirement to use a wholly identical set of questions for all respondents. Item response models 
allow for an estimation of a latent trait as long as there exists a common space that contains all 
respondents. If we define that two respondents are connected if it is possible to write a path from 
one to the other by tracing the questions they answer, a common space means that there must exist 
at least one path to connect a respondent to each of the other respondents. 
Table 1 presents an illustration of a common space. A black dot indicates that the 
respondent answers the corresponding question. Respondents A, B, and C are located in a common 
space because it is possible to create a path from each of the respondents to any of the other ones 
based on the questions they answer. A path from A to C, for example, will involve B as the go-
between. Respondent D, on the other hand, is not in the same common space as A, B, and C. She 
answers a totally different set of questions and cannot be compared to A, B, and C. 
The common space works because respondents’ latent conservatism scores are defined 
relative to each other (Equation 6). That is, the scores are in principle the positions of the 
respondents in relation to the positions of other respondents in the common space. In Table 1, 
respondents A and C answer different sets of questions. Considering only this aspect, both are 
incomparable. However, an IRT model estimates respondent A relative to B and respondent B 
relative to C. As such, respondents A and C will become comparable due to respondent B. 
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[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
 
Analysis I: Item Response Estimation 
 I used the publicly available dataset from the Pew Research Center (2013). Between 
October 2011 and November 2012, Pew surveyed 32,604 Muslims in 26 countries and asked 
various questions on social attitudes and religious practices, among others. Selecting which among 
these questions must be used in the IRT was the first important task. In the next three subsections, 
I describe how I selected the IRT questions from the survey’s pool of questions, specifications of 
the IRT model, and results from the IRT estimation. Since it is impossible to present all 32,604 
individual scores, I aggregate the scores on the country-level. 
 
Question Selection and Dimensionality 
 Deciding which questions to use from the survey data is a crucial step because all other 
steps follow from it. Yet, it is also the one least “scientific”. It resembles art more than hard science. 
The conventional concept of statistical significance is almost of no help because this step involves 
exploration more than inference and because the huge sample size would make virtually everything 
statistically significant. I approached this challenge in three steps. In the first step, I went through 
the questionnaire and identified questions that on the face value (1) pertain to attitudes or opinions 
on social issues, (2) have social components in the sense that the question is related to people, 
society, or social groups, (3) are related to Islamic conservatism; and (4) were asked in at least half 
of the countries studied. The criteria helped to exclude demographic and personal history 
questions, questions that are related to faith doctrines (e.g., Q43j “Believe in one God”), and 
country-specific questions. Forty questions passed these requirements. 
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In the second step, I dichotomized non-binary questions. The dichotomizing rule is simple. 
Conservative responses were assigned a value of “1” and “0” otherwise. This means that the 
dichotomization was not symmetric. For example, Q83 asked whether sons or daughters should 
have a greater right to parents’ inheritance. The responses are “sons”, “daughters”, “both have 
equal rights”, and “neither”. Because the conservative response in this case would be “sons”, I 
assigned a value of “1” to respondents who answered “sons” and “0” otherwise. 
 In the third step, I did an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with the WLSMV3 (weighted 
least square with mean and variance adjusted) estimation method in MPLUS 7.3. The goal is to 
find items that go together strong enough so that they may be justifiably modeled with a 
unidimensional IRT. Another, more substantive, goal is to provide a picture of the structures of 
Muslims’ social attitudes: what issues go together with what and how many factors best represent 
the attitudes. 
I did the exploration by examining the amount of variance explained by models 
incorporating between one and five latent factors with varimax rotation. Specifying one latent 
factor to explain all 40 variables accounts for 24.22% of the variables’ variance. Each additional 
factor explains 10.5%, 4.4%, 2.3%, and 2.3% of the variance, respectively. There is no textbook 
guidance of what to do when a factor analysis indicates that a large number of factors is needed to 
explain large enough variance in the data. Certain responsible judgment calls are needed. 
                                                            
3 The approach treats each of the dichotomous observed variables as having a continuous 
underlying latent variable and tries to estimate this underlying variable. The weight matrix is 
constructed from the robust variance form of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the parameters 
(Muthen, du Toit, and Spisic 1997) 
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In making such calls, I consider two things. First, unidimensional IRT models have been 
shown to be robust to the violation of unidimensionality. That is, although the underlying data is 
not strictly unidimensional, unidimensional IRT models still provide robust parameter estimates 
(Harrison 1986; Ip 2010). This is especially helpful when a researcher is faced with a choice 
between violating a strict unidimensionality and estimating a hard-to-interpret multidimensional 
model with a large number of factors.  
Second, in addition to explained variance, I also consider whether adding a factor “steals” 
questions away from the previous factors. A factor can be regarded as stable if adding another 
factor does not change which questions load to it. This is the reason I only explored the model up 
to five latent factors. Adding a factor from four to five (or even six) does not change the pattern of 
questions that load to the first and second factors. Questions that are explained by the first and 
second factors continue to load most substantively to them even after another factor is added. The 
first and second factors therefore can be regarded as the underlying traits of their respective 
questions. The interested reader should consult the Online Supplement for details of the process.  
Table 2 presents the amount of variance of each question that is explained by each factor 
in the five-factor EFA model. I set the threshold of inclusion to be 10%. That is, a question counts 
as loaded to a factor if the factor best explains the question and if it explains at least 10% of the 
question’s variance. Of particular interest are the first and second factors. They are stable because 
they explain their respective questions equally well even in the four-factor model (see Online 
Supplement). Adding a fifth or sixth factor does not take from these factors their questions. 
They also on the face value represent our variables of interest: Islamic and general 
conservatisms. The first factor best represents Islamic conservatism, whereas the second factor 
covers a general social conservatism. Abortion, prostitution, and homosexuality are debated 
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everywhere, not exclusively by Muslims. In the remainder of this section, to conserve space, I 
focus on Islamic conservatism. The interested reader should consult the Online Supplement for 
estimation results of the general social conservatism model. It is worth noting that changing the 
threshold (from 10% to some other value) does not greatly affect the parameter estimates. This is 
due to the robustness of the unidimensional IRT and the parallel between IRT’s discriminating 
parameter and factor loading. A question with a small loading is automatically weighted less in 
the IRT estimation and therefore does not greatly affect the resulting estimates. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
IRT Estimation 
 I separately estimated the Islamic and general conservatism models using their respective 
questions. The reason for these separate estimations as opposed to estimating a two-dimensional 
IRT model is because the benefit does not seem to outweigh the cost. Computing a two-
dimensional IRT requires a greater computational power, especially with the large sample size. A 
two-dimensional IRT model is also harder to interpret than a one-dimensional one. On the other 
hand, the preceding factor analysis shows that the two factors are virtually orthogonal to each 
other. Each factor’s questions are only weakly loaded to the other factor. This suggests that 
specifying a second dimension would not do much to explain the first dimension’s questions.  
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Estimations of the two conservatism models followed the same procedure. To improve 
computational speed, I used R’s MCMCpack package (Martin, Quinn, and Park 2013)4. I specified 
the priors as 𝜃~𝑁(0,1) and (𝛽, 𝛼)~𝑀2 ([
0
0
] , [
1 0
0 1
]) and constrained the most conservative 
respondents (i.e., those with the highest rate of agreement) to have positive scores and the least 
conservative ones to have negative scores. I set the number of iterations to 15,000 and thinning 
interval to 10 (i.e., the program saved only every 10th iteration), which, in addition to another 
10,000 burn-in (i.e., sampling iterations that were discarded and not stored), created an effective 
160,000 iterations. 
 Convergence diagnostics suggest that the MCMC process in each model successfully 
reached the stationary distribution. A simple predictive test also provides evidence that the models 
predict respondents’ answers to the questions better than a coin toss (an average of 79% for the 
Islamic conservatism model and 87% for the general conservatism model). Details of these 
evidence are available in the Online Supplement. 
 
Results of IRT Estimation 
Gaining a greater confidence that the MCMC processes converged and the models have 
sufficient explanatory power on their respective questions, I now turn to the estimation results. To 
conserve space, only visual descriptions of the results are presented and emphasis is put on the 
Islamic conservatism model. The interested reader should consult the Online Supplement for a 
more complete presentation of the models’ statistics.  
                                                            
4 The models were run on a high-end computing system available in the author’s university. The 
Islamic and general conservatism models each took 50 and 36 hours to complete, respectively. 
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Figures 1 and 2 present point estimates, density distributions (represented by the shaded 
strips), and 95% credible intervals for the discriminating and difficulty parameters of questions 
from the Islamic conservatism model. In terms of discriminating parameters, it is noteworthy that 
the analysis produces two groups of questions, one with 𝛽 ≤ 1 and the other with 𝛽 > 1. Questions 
in the first group have a low discriminating power and are less capable to discriminate between 
conservative and moderate respondents. Questions in the second group, on the other hand, have a 
high discriminating power and are particularly good in separating conservatives and moderates. 
Interestingly, out of five questions in this category, the top three are related to issues that border 
human rights violations (e.g., death penalty for those who leave Islam and stoning for adulterers). 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
 In regard to difficulty parameters, two things are worth noting. First, the distribution is 
more dispersed. Most questions lie somewhere between −.5 and +.5, but it is impossible to 
categorize them as in regard to the discriminating parameters. Second, it is interesting to note that 
the questions on which the respondents were least likely to agree, regardless of their conservatism 
scores, pertain to whether women do not have the right to decide for themselves whether or not to 
wear a veil and to whether people who leave Islam must be punished by death. 
The difficulty parameter of the veil question is interesting because it means that the 
respondents tended to agree that a decision of whether or not to wear a veil to some extent must 
be decided by the woman’s herself. This contradicts the notion that Muslims regard women rights 
as practically non-existent. In terms of respondents’ disagreement that people who leave Islam 
must be punished by death, one might quickly blame social desirability bias. Perhaps the 
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respondents did not want to sound extreme during the interviews or were concerned with their 
securities so as to tone down their answers. On the other hand, the fact that the question elicited 
least agreement even when compared to other explicitly violent questions (e.g., stoning for 
adulterers, hand-cutting for thieves) suggests that social desirability cannot be the whole story. 
Perhaps a significant portion of the respondents disagreed with the question because they truly 
thought that a conversion from Islam should not lead to capital punishment. 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
After item parameters, the next parameter of interest is 𝜃 or the latent conservatism score. 
I aggregate the 32,604 individual scores on the country level. I took sampling weight into account 
by multiplying the country’s respondents’ scores with the probabilities of the respective 
respondents being selected in the survey. Formally, for each MCMC iteration, 
Θ𝑖 =
1
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑖
𝑗=1
 
(7) 
where Θ𝑖 is the Islamic conservatism score for country 𝑖,  𝑖 = 1, … ,26  in that particular iteration, 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the sampling weight for respondent 𝑗 in country 𝑖, 𝜃𝑖𝑗 is the Islamic conservatism score for 
respondent 𝑗 in country 𝑖 in that iteration, and 𝑛𝑖 is the number of respondents in country 𝑖. 
 Figure 3 presents country-level Islamic conservatism scores. It provides strong support for 
the common knowledge that Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with other Arab countries, are 
relatively conservative. The world’s largest Muslim-majority country Indonesia occupies the 
middle of the spectrum and is less conservative than its neighbor Malaysia. Indonesian Muslims 
are also relatively less conservative than Southern Thai Muslims who struggle to define their 
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existence in the Buddhist-majority Thailand. Turkey, one of the favorite case studies in the study 
of Muslim democracies, is relatively moderate. The only Muslim-majority countries that are less 
conservative than Turkey are post-Soviet or European ones (e.g., Albania, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan), which points to a possible legacy of communist institutions and political culture—a 
potentially fruitful topic for future studies. 
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
Before proceeding to the analysis of how well Islamic conservatism predicts support for 
religious freedom, it is necessary to examine how Islamic conservatism, general conservatism, and 
religiosity are different from each other. I use four different indicators of religiosity, all recoded 
so that higher values mean higher religiosity. Reading the Qur’an (Q65) asked respondents how 
often they read or listen to the Qur’an. Responses range from “never” (score of 1) to “every day” 
(score of 5). Frequency of prayer (Q61) asked how often respondents prayed outside of religious 
services attendance. Values range from 1 (“never”) to 7 (“several times a day”). Attending Mosque 
(Q34) indicates how frequent respondents went to mosque for salah and Friday prayer. Responses 
range from 1 (“never”) to 6 (“more than once a week”). Lastly, importance of religion (Q36) asked 
how important religion was in the respondents’ lives. It ranges from 1 (“not at all important”) to 4 
(“very important”). I treat these indicators separately instead of creating a composite index in part 
because they have different response scales and a composite index would need a justification on 
how to weight the variables (also see Blaydes and Linzer 2012). Future research may be interested 
in addressing how to calculate religiosity more empirically, such as by applying Bayesian IRT on 
a set of religiosity indicators. 
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Table 3 presents individual-level correlations between the variables. Two patterns are 
noteworthy. First, the correlation between Islamic and general conservatism is low, which suggests 
that the two are indeed different. Second, correlations between Islamic conservatism and 
religiosity are higher than ones between general social conservatism and religiosity. This supports 
the argument made in the literature review that Islamic conservatism is more strongly related to 
Islam and its teachings than general social conservatism is. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Analysis II: Islamic Conservatism and Religious Freedom 
 Having estimated the Islamic conservatism model and show that it is different from 
religiosity and a general social conservatism, I now examine its relationship to support for religious 
freedom. I employed a multilevel logistic regression with random intercept. A multilevel modeling 
is appropriate in this case since individuals as units of analysis are nested within countries. 
 
Dependent Variables 
  The dependent variables come from the same Pew dataset used in the IRT estimation (Q10 
and Q11). Q10 asked respondents on a 4-point scale their perception of how free religious 
minorities in their countries were to practice their religions. I dichotomized the responses and 
assigned a value of 1 to those who perceived that minorities were free and 0 otherwise. Q11 
followed up this question by asking whether the freedom (or lack thereof) was a good thing. 
I created two dichotomous dependent variables out of these questions. The first, affirmation 
of freedom (hereafter, Affirmation), was calculated only for respondents who indicated that 
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religious minorities in their countries were free. These respondents were assigned a value of 1 if 
they indicated in Q11 that such a freedom was a good thing and 0 otherwise. This variable therefore 
taps into affirming that religious minorities being free is a good thing. The second variable, 
opposition to discrimination (hereafter, Opposition), taps into the opposition to minorities being 
discriminated. It was calculated only among those who indicated in Q10 that religious minorities 
were not free to practice their religions. It takes a value of 1 if the respondent indicated that such 
a lack of freedom was a bad thing, and 0 otherwise.  
 Roughly 86% of respondents either said that minorities were free and that was a good thing 
or that minorities were not free and that was bad. Breaking the percentage further down, this 
proportion is dominated (94%) by respondents who thought that minorities in their countries were 
free and that was a good thing. This suggests that the Affirmation variable may be prone to social 
desirability bias. Even conservative respondents arguably did not want to make their countries look 
unfree or indicate that freedom for minorities was bad. The Opposition variable is therefore a 
harder test for the hypothesis since it involves both explicitly acknowledging that minorities were 
not free and stating that the lack of freedom was a bad thing. 
 
Individual-Level Explanatory Variables 
 In addition to the Islamic and general conservatism scores obtained from the IRT 
estimations, I included seven other individual-level predictors: education level, age, gender, 
personal economic condition, country economic condition, religiosity, and number of Muslim 
friends. Education level was calculated from Q101 in the dataset. Since Pew’s coding of education 
varies across countries, I followed Blaydes and Linzer’s (2012) approach and created a 3-category 
education variable (less than secondary education, at least secondary education, and at least 
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university level). Age is a continuous variable obtained from Q96, whereas gender is a 
dichotomous variable with males as reference derived from Q95.  
Personal economic condition is measured by the respondent’s subjective assessment of her 
personal economic situation (Q7). Responses range from 1 (“very bad”) to 4 (“very good”). The 
inclusion of personal economic condition and education level tests whether Islamic conservatism 
has an explanatory power on the dependent variables that is beyond and above the effects of socio-
economic predictors that are the main thrust of the modernization theory. Perceived economic 
condition of the country, on the other hand, was derived from Q6 of the questionnaire and has 
responses ranging from 1 (“very bad”) to 4 (“very good”). It is a proxy for policy satisfaction and 
support for the government. The literature suggests that hostilities toward religious outgroups may 
originate from a perception that the government has been biased toward the minorities, resulting 
in a poor economic condition in general and among the majority (Hui 2010; Moghaddam 2006) 
To control for religiosity level, I include the frequency of prayer variable. The variable is 
widely used as an indicator of religiosity in the religion and politics literature (e.g., Putnam and 
Campbell 2010). The frequency of reading the Qur’an may be biased against the less educated and 
the illiterate. The go to mosque variable may be discriminating against women because in some 
countries it is uncommon for women to go to mosque. The importance of religion, on the other 
hand, is too broad for my purpose of tapping into personal piety. Switching among these indicators, 
however, does not greatly affect the conclusions. Lastly, I include the number of respondent’s 
close friends who are Muslims (Q49) to account for the effect of social networks (e.g., Djupe and 
Calfano 2012; Putnam and Campbell 2010). People may be less tolerant toward minorities if they 
have fewer close friends from the minority groups. Responses for this variable range from 1 (“none 
of them”) to 5 (“all of them”). 
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Country-Level Explanatory Variables 
 As country-level variables, I included for each country the logged value of its 2010 Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, its 2010 Human Development Index (HDI) score, its 
proportion of Muslim population in 2010, and the average of its Government Regulation Index 
(GRI) scores from 2003, 2005, and 2008. GDP per capita and the HDI score were obtained from 
the World Bank’s and the United Nations Development Programme’s databases, respectively. 
These indicators are intended to control for the effects of social and economic modernization. 
Proportion of Muslims and the GRI score, on the other hand, were obtained from the 2011 update 
of the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA) National Profiles dataset5. 
Proportion of Muslims is included as a proxy for Muslims’ general social and economic 
influence. Tolerance for minorities may be decreasing as Muslims become larger in number and 
take a dominating role in the society. Alternatively, the relationship may be curvilinear in that after 
a certain point proportion of Muslim population no longer matters because it is already so high 
Muslims no longer perceive non-Muslims as a feasible threat.  
Lastly, the GRI is included to control for the countries’ institutional differences. Countries 
do not engage religions in the same way or level (Stepan 2000). Some build a wall to separate the 
sacred and the secular. Some have no such wall, but still nonetheless maintain an impartial 
relationship with all religions. Still, some others play favorites by building institutions that favor 
one religion, sometimes at the expense of the others. This institutional partiality relates to societal 
                                                            
5 Available from http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Downloads/INTL2008_DL.asp and 
downloaded on May 27, 2015. 
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partiality (Grim and Finke 2006). It is hard to expect a tolerant society if institutions of the state 
themselves are nurturing discrimination. Discrimination of minority beliefs may be simply a 
function of the government regulating against the beliefs, as opposed to the citizens themselves 
are intolerant toward the beliefs. By including the GRI score, I intend to control for these 
institutional factors and get a cleaner estimate of the effect of Islamic conservatism. 
 
Results 
Table 4 presents regression coefficients from the two models6. It provides evidence for the 
negative effect of Islamic conservatism on the two indicators of support for religious freedom. 
Respondents with a higher Islamic conservatism score were less likely to agree that freedom for 
religious minorities is a good thing (Model 1) or that a lack of freedom for minorities is a bad thing 
(Model 2).  
To facilitate an understanding of the effect of Islamic conservatism on tolerance toward 
minorities, Figure 4 presents the estimated probabilities of a positive response (value of 1) on each 
of the dependent variables across a range of Islamic conservatism scores when other continuous 
predictors are set to their means and binary predictor (gender) to its reference (males). A movement 
in the conservative direction from -2 to +27 results in a 5% decrease in the probability of saying 
                                                            
6 A total of 19 countries were analyzed from 26 countries available in the Pew dataset. Morocco 
and Uzbekistan were excluded because the general conservatism questions were not fielded there. 
Russia and Thailand were excluded because they are not Muslim-majority. Afghanistan, Iran, and 
Kosovo were excluded for missing one or more variables needed for the multilevel modeling. 
7 This is approximately the range of the Islamic conservatism variable (-2.28 to 1.84). 
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that freedom for minorities is a good thing and a 19% decrease in the probability of saying that 
restriction toward religious minorities is a bad thing. Islamic conservatism therefore has its 
strongest impact on the opposition to discrimination. Among respondents who perceived that 
religious minorities were unfairly treated, those high in Islamic conservatism were less likely to 
think that such a restriction is bad. 
In addition to the expected effect of Islamic conservatism, Table 4 also reveals a positive 
effect of general social conservatism on all dependent measures. Viewing it from the perspective 
of liberal Western politics, an individual who opposes homosexuality or alcohol is presumably a 
conservative and often be equated to fundamentalists or extremists. But the findings from Table 4 
suggests that such a labeling oversimplifies things and care must be taken to differentiate different 
types of conservatism.  
Personal economic condition and the perception of the country’s economic condition both 
have contradictory effects on the Affirmation and Opposition variables. They significantly 
increase the probability of the former and decrease the latter’s. Respondents who had a more 
positive perception of the economy were more likely to state that freedom for minorities was a 
good thing but less likely to say that a lack of freedom for such people was a bad thing. In other 
words, they were more likely to express an affirmative (“good”) response in the follow-up question 
(Q11), regardless of their assessments of whether or not minorities were free.  
This may be due to the better perception of economic well-being leads to a lower 
willingness to disrupt the status quo. In other words, individuals tend to think that people get what 
they deserve (Lerner 1980). When an individual does well in the system or perceives that the 
system is doing well, she becomes less willing to oppose the system, which in this case manifests 
in the higher probability of saying that freedom for minorities was good in the case that they 
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perceived such a freedom or the lower probability of saying that discrimination toward minorities 
was bad (which is equivalent to a higher probability of saying that discrimination was good) in the 
case that they perceived such a discrimination. Future research may want to explore this finding 
further. How does people’s support for status quo influence the effort to improve minorities’ 
religious freedom? 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
Robustness Check: Authoritarianism in Disguise? 
 A last analysis is needed to test the robustness of the findings. Specifically, could it be that 
Islamic conservatism is nothing but authoritarianism in another form? After all, studies have linked 
religious conservatism to authoritarianism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005) and authoritarian 
predispositions are known to lead to conservative political attitudes (e.g., Cizmar et al. 2013; 
Hetherington and Weiler 2009). To test this hypothesis, I did a series of multilevel logistic 
regressions. I used a question that asked respondents whether a democratic form of government is 
preferable to a strong leader (Q14) as a proxy for authoritarianism. It is a rough proxy, but it is the 
best that is available in the dataset and is theoretically justified by authoritarians’ strong preference 
for order and support for authority. I assigned a value of 1 if respondents preferred a strong leader 
to a democratic government and 0 otherwise. 
 Table 5 presents the results of the robustness test. In the first model, I predict the preference 
for a strong leader. Both types of conservatism increase the probability of respondents preferring 
a strong leader to a democratic government. This suggests that Islamic and general conservatisms 
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are both related to authoritarianism. In the second and third models, I re-estimated the models from 
Table 4, including leader preference as another predictor. These models generally support the 
robustness of the findings. Both Islamic and general conservatisms maintain their statistically 
significant negative and positive effects, respectively, on the support for religious freedom. This 
suggests that Islamic and general conservatisms are more than just authoritarianism in disguise. 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Discussion 
 This article aims to contribute to the study of the Muslim world on the methodological and 
theoretical levels. In this last section, I discuss how these contributions have been made and how 
they may be further advanced in future research. 
 
Methodological Contributions 
Methodologically, I employ Bayesian item response theory to estimate the Islamic 
conservatism scores of 32,604 respondents in 26 countries across the world. To the best of my 
knowledge, this study is the first to compare countries based on how conservative their citizens 
are across a wide range of social issues. This approach offers researchers at least two advantages 
relative to the previous studies. First, the use of IRT allows the researcher to utilize a fuller set of 
survey questions, even if the respondents answered only different parts of the survey. This prevents 
the need to discard questions or cases and enables the researcher to get a more complete picture of 
the respondents' attitudes.  
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The advantage of this contribution is obvious. A researcher who employs the traditional 
method of using only cases that share similar questions to calculate an Islamic conservatism score 
from the same 16 questions produced by the EFA in Table 2 would lose eight countries 
(Afghanistan, Albania, Iran, Morocco, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Uzbekistan) because at least 
one of the questions was not asked in those countries. These constitute almost one third of the 26 
countries studied. A significant amount of information therefore would be lost. 
Second, IRT estimates questions' difficulty and discriminating parameters and allows 
scholars of the Muslim world to understand what issues Muslims are least likely to agree with and 
what issues best discriminate between conservative and moderate Muslims. Future research may 
want to follow up this topic by examining geographical variations. Do Muslims in Asia, Middle 
East, Europe, and the United States, for example, assign different importance to different issues? 
The existing evidence hints to this possibility. American Muslims, for example, find themselves 
much better assimilated socially and economically to the American society than their European 
counterparts do to their respective countries (Jamal 2010). This difference in turn may lead to 
different attitudes toward democracy and liberal democratic values. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
 When it comes to theoretical contributions, this article illuminates an aspect in Muslims’ 
religious life that explains their support of religious freedom or lack thereof. I present empirical 
evidence that Islamic conservatism has a detrimental effect on the support for religious freedom 
and that it is different from being religious or being socially conservative. This is indeed consistent 
with a large body of literature that discusses how religious ethnocentrism uniquely shapes one’s 
attitudes (e.g., Altemeyer 2003; Laythe, Finkel, and Kirkpatrick 2001; Mavor et al. 2009). 
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 The question, then, why does Islamic conservatism have such a strong effect? What drives 
it? There are at least two possible answers. The first is psychological. Studies have related 
fundamentalism to a psychological predisposition characterized by closed-mindedness and 
authoritarianism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005; Saroglou 2002). Due to this predisposition, 
people high in Islamic conservatism may be less accepting of diversity and less tolerant toward 
other groups. A consequence of this view is that the effect of Islamic conservatism on tolerance 
would be generalized to other groups, regardless of whether the groups are religious or secular in 
nature. This is indeed a strong claim since it attributes the cause to the person and to an extent 
neglects the context. 
 The second explanation is more political and sociological and places a greater emphasis on 
the social environment. By focusing on the individual, the first explanation assumes that the way 
an individual thinks about social issues follows closely the way she thinks about religion. An  open-
minded person thinks open-mindedly in all situations, whereas a close-minded person thinks close-
mindedly. Research, however, has shown that individuals have a hierarchy of values (Jacoby 2014; 
Tetlock 1986) and engage in motivated reasoning (Jost et al. 2003). The pressure to engage in 
motivated reasoning is the highest when an issue or value conflicts with core beliefs that have a 
much higher priority. This implies that even individuals who are high in Islamic conservatism and 
predisposed to think narrowly do not always think that way. These individuals can avoid motivated 
reasoning and think freely when the issues they are facing are distant enough from their religious 
beliefs (Hood, Hill, and Spilka 2009; Hunsberger, Pratt, and Pancer 1994). In that case, there is 
little need to subjugate the issues to the faith. 
 An important consequence follows that highlights the important role of political elites. 
Elites politicize issues and religion as one of the most important sources of moral codes is a 
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particularly appealing object of politicization (Wald, Silverman, and Fridy 2005). Employing 
religious framing on a political issue will affect the public’s perception of how well connected the 
issue is with religion (Chong and Druckman 2007). The more an issue is paired with religion, the 
more religious beliefs become a relevant and superordinate consideration for that issue.  
In the context of American politics, this politicization helps explain how issues like 
abortion and gay marriage are increasingly tied to religious divides (Putnam and Campbell 2010). 
In the Muslim world, the role of political elites is evident in the shaping of anti-American attitudes 
among Muslims (Blaydes and Linzer 2012). In countries where politics is competitive, both 
Islamists and secularists present a nationalistic, anti-American posture to appeal to the voters. To 
the contrary, in countries where Islamists are already dominant, there is no need to resort to anti-
Americanism, which corresponds to a lower level of anti-Americanism in those countries.  
By the same token, one may hypothesize that politicization of religion drives the 
relationship between Islamic conservatism and support for religious freedom. Politicians use 
religious appeals to invite voters to support a greater role of religion in politics and form a coalition 
of religiously conservative voters. Since it is impossible to build an identification to an ingroup 
without also defining an outgroup (Billig and Tajfel 1973), the same appeal then results in a lower 
tolerance and acceptance toward non-Muslim minorities. An implication of this view is that 
Islamic conservatism should be less influential when predicting tolerance toward groups that are 
not strongly related to religion, such as political dissenters. 
Issues related to the general social conservatism, on the other hand, are weakly politicized 
because there is only little controversy concerning them. Issues such as abortion or same-sex 
marriage are still off the table in most of the countries studied. As a result, these issues have no 
negative bearing on tolerance toward religious minorities. The positive effect of this type of 
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conservatism on the tolerance toward religious minorities may be actually explained by a sharing 
of values. Religious people, including minorities, are more likely to be opposed to issues related 
to the general social conservatism. Supporting religious freedom for minorities therefore may be 
perceived as a support for like-minded people. Future research will benefit from exploring why 
and how the two types of conservatism are different and examine how this differentiation is related 
to the patterns of elite competitions in Muslim-majority countries. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Albert, James H. 1992. “Bayesian Estimation of Normal Ogive Item Response Curves Using Gibbs 
Sampling.” Journal of Educational Statistics 17(3): 251-269. 
Albertson, Bethany L. 2014. Dog-whistle politics: Multivocal communication and religious 
appeals. Political Behavior 37(1):3-26. 
Altemeyer, Bob. 2003. “Why Do Religious Fundamentalists end to be Prejudiced?” The 
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 13:17-28. 
Altemeyer, Bob, & Bruce Hunsberger. 2005. “Fundamentalism and Authoritarianism.” In 
Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, eds., Raymond F. Paloutzian & 
Crystal L. Park. New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 378-393 
Bazan, Jorge L., Heleno Bolfarine, and Roseli A. Leandro. 2006. “Sensitivity Analysis of Prior 
Specification for the Probit-Normal IRT Model: An Empirical Study.” Estadistica 58: 17-
42.  
Billig, Michael. and Henri. Tajfel. 1973. "Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup 
Behavior." European Journal of Social Psychology 3: 27-52. 
34 
 
Blaydes, Lisa, and Drew A Linzer. 2008. “The Political Economy of Women’s Support for 
Fundamentalist Islam.” World Politics 60(04): 576–609. 
Blaydes, Lisa, and Drew A Linzer. 2012. “Elite Competition, Religiosity, Anti-Americanism in 
the Islamic World.” American Political Science Review 106(2): 225–43. 
Bock, R. Darrell. 1997. “A Brief History of Item Response Theory.” Educational Measurement: 
Issues and Practice 16(4): 21-33. 
Brathwaite, R., & Bramsen, A. 2011. “Reconceptualizing Church and State: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Separation of Religion and State on Democracy.” 
Politics and Religion 4: 229-263. 
Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. “Framing Theory”. Annual Review of Political 
Science 10:103-126. 
Cizmar, Anne M., Geoffrey C. Layman, John McTague, Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz and Michael 
Spivey. 2013. “Authoritarianism and American Political Behavior from 1952 to 2008.” 
Political Research Quarterly 67(1):71–83. 
Clinton, Joshua, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call 
Data.” American Political Science Review 98(2): 355-370. 
Djupe, Paul., and Brian. R. Calfano. 2012. “American Muslim Investment in Civil Society: 
Political Discussion, Disagreement, and Tolerance.” Political Research Quarterly 65(3): 
516–28. 
Ellison, Christopher, and Marc A. Musick. 1993. “Southern Intolerance: A Fundamentalist 
Effect?” Social Forces 72: 379-398. 
Esposito, John and Dalia Mogahed. 2007. Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really 
Think. Gallup Press. 
35 
 
Fox, Jonathan. 2006. “World Separation of Religion and State into the 21st Century.” 
Comparative Political Studies 39: 537-569. 
Gelman, Andrew, John B. Carlin, Hal. S. Stern, and Donald B. Rubin. 2004. Bayesian Data 
Analysis 2nd Edition. New York: Chapman & Hall. 
Gibson, James L. 2010. “The Political Consequences of Religiosity: Does Religion Always Cause 
Political Intolerance?” In Religion and Democracy in the United States: Danger or 
Opportunity?, eds., Alan Wolfe and Ira Katznelson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 147-175. 
Greenberg, Jeff, Tom Pyszczynski, and Sheldon Solomon. 1986. “The Causes and Consequences 
of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management Theory.” In Public Self and Private Self, 
ed. Roy Baumeister. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 189-212. 
Grim, Brian, and Roger Finke. 2006. “International Religion Indexes: Government Regulation, 
Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion.” Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Research on Religion 2: 2–40. 
Gu, Man-Li and Eduard J. Bomhoff. 2012. “Religion and Support for Democracy: A Comparative 
Study for Catholic and Muslim Countries.” Politics and Religion 5: 280-316. 
Harrison, David. 1986. “Robustness of IRT Parameter Estimation to Violations of The 
Unidimensionality Assumption.” Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics 11(2): 
91–115. 
Hetherington, Marc J. and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009. Authoritarianism and Polarization in 
American Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hofmann, Steven R. 2004. “Islam and Democracy: Micro-Level Indications of Compatibility.” 
Comparative Political Studies 37(6): 652–76. 
36 
 
Hood, Ralph W Jr., Peter C Hill, and Bernard Spilka. 2009. The Psychology of Religion: An 
Empirical Approach (4th Ed). The Guilford Press. 
Hui, Jennifer Y. 2010. “The Internet in Indonesia: Development and Impact of Radical Websites.” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33: 171-191. 
Hunsberger, B, M Pratt, and S M Pancer. 1994. “Religious Fundamentalism and Integrative 
Complexity of Thought: A Relationship for Existential Content Only?” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 33(August 1991): 335–46. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. The Clash of Civilizations. Remaking of the World Order. New York: 
Simon and Schuster. 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. Modernization and Post-modernization: Cultural, Economic and 
Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Inglehart, Ronald. 2003. “How Solid Is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Can We 
Measure It?” PS: Political Science & Politics 36(01): 51–58. 
Ip, Edward Haksing. 2010. “Empirically Indistinguishable Multidimensional IRT and Locally 
Dependent Unidimensional Item Response Models.” The British Journal of Mathematical 
and Statistical Psychology 63(2): 395–416. 
Jackman, Simon. 2009. Bayesian Analysis for the Social Sciences. Wiley & Sons. 
Jacoby, William G. 2014. “Is There a Culture War? Conflicting Value Structure in American 
Public Opinion.” American Political Science Review 108(4): 754-771. 
Jamal, Amaney. 2010. “Muslim Americans: Enriching or Depleting American Democracy?” In 
Religion and Democracy in the United States: Danger or Opportunity?, eds. Alan Wolfe and 
Ira Katznelson. Princeton, NJ: 89-113. 
37 
 
Jamal, Amaney and Mark Tessler. 2008. “Attitudes in the Arab World.” Journal of Democracy 
19(1): 97-110. 
Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie Kruglanski, and Frank Sulloway. 2003. “Political Conservatism as 
Motivated Social Cognition.” Psychological Bulletin 129(3): 339-375. 
Kedourie, Elie. 1992. Politics in the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Layman, Geoffrey C. 2001. The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American 
Party Politics. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
Laythe, Brian, Deborah Finkel, and Lee A Kirkpatrick. 2001. “Predicting Prejudice from 
Religious Fundamentalism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism: A Multiple-Regression 
Approach.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40(1): 1. 
Lerner, Melvin J. 1980. The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion. Perspectives in 
Social Psychology. New York: Plenum Press. 
Levendusky, Matthew S. and Jeremy C. Pope. “Measuring Aggregate-Level Ideological 
Heterogeneity.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 35: 259-282. 
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore and London: The 
John Hopkins University Press. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1994. “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited.” American 
Sociological Review 59: 1-22. 
Lord, Frederic M. and Melvin R. Novick. 1968. Statistical Theories of Mental Test Scores. 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
Martin, Andrew D. and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999.” Policy Analysis 10: 134-153. 
38 
 
Martin, Andrew D., Kevin M. Quinn, and Jong Hee Park. 2013. “MCMCpack: Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo in R.” Journal of Statistical Software 42(9): 1-21. 
Maseland, Robbert and Andre van Hoorn. 2011. “Why Muslims Like Democracy yet Have So 
Little of It.” Public Choice 147: 481-496. 
Mavor, Kenneth I., Cari J. Macleod, Miranda J. Boal, and Winnifred R. Louis. 2009. “Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism, Fundamentalism and Prejudice Revisited: Removing Suppression and 
Statistical Artefact.” Personality and Individual Differences 46(5-6): 592–97. 
McFarland, Sam G., James C. Warren. 1992. “Religious Orientations and Selective Exposure 
among Fundamentalist Christians.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 31: 163-174. 
Milligan, Scott, Robert Andersen, and Robert Brym. 2014. “Assessing Variation in Tolerance in 
23 Muslim-Majority and Western Countries.” Canadian Review of Sociology 51(3): 239–61. 
Moghaddam, Fatali M. 2006. From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why 
They Come to Destroy. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. 
Muluk, Hamdi, Nathanael G. Sumaktoyo, and Dhyah M. Ruth. 2012. “Jihad as Justification: 
National Survey Evidence of Belief in Violent Jihad as a Mediating Factor for Sacred 
Violence among Muslims in Indonesia.” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 16(2): 101-111. 
Mujani, Saiful, and William Liddle. 2007. “Leadership, Party, and Religion: Explaining Voting 
Behavior in Indonesia” Comparative Political Studies 40(7): 832-857. 
Mujani, Saiful, and William Liddle. 2009. “Muslim Indonesia's Secular Democracy.” Asian 
Survey 49: 575-590. 
Muthen, Bengt O., Stephen H. C. du Toit, and Damir Spisic. 1997. “Robust Inference using 
Weighted Least Squares and Quadratic Estimating Equations in Latent Variable Modeling.” 
39 
 
Downloaded from http://www.statmodel.com/bmuthen/articles/Article_075.pdf on April 24, 
2015. 
Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2002. “Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the Clash of 
Civilizations Thesis.” Comparative Sociology 1(3-4): 235-263. 
Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2012. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide 
2nd Edition. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Pew Global. 2008. Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe. Retrieved 
from http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2008/09/Pew-2008-Pew-Global-Attitudes-Report-3-
September-17-2pm.pdf on June 5, 2015. 
Pew Research Center. April 2013. The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society. Retrieved 
from http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-
overview/ on January 30, 2015. Dataset version: October 2014. 
Philpott, D. 2007. Explaining the political ambivalence of religion. American Political Science 
Review, 101(3), 505-525. 
Putnam,  Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. 2010. American Grace: How Religion Divides and 
Unites Us. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Rose, Richard. 2002. “How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia.” Journal of 
Democracy 13(4): 102-111. 
Rowley, Charles, and Nathanael Smith. 2009. “Islam’s Democracy Paradox: Muslims Claim to 
Like Democracy, so Why Do They Have so Little?” Public Choice 139(3): 273–299. 
40 
 
Saroglou, Vassilis. 2002. “Religion and the Five Factors of Personality: A Meta-Analytic Review.” 
Personality and Individual Differences 32(1): 15–25. 
Savage, Sara, and Jose Liht. 2008. “Mapping Fundamentalisms: The Psychology of religion as a 
Sub-discipline in the Understanding of Religiously Motivated Violence.” Archive for the 
Psychology of Religion 30: 75-91. 
Smidt, Lyman Kellstedt, and James L. Guth. 2009. “The Role of Religion in American Politics: 
Explanatory Theories and Associated Analytical and Measurement Issues” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Religion and American Politics, eds. James L. Guth, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and 
Corwin E. Smidt. New York: Oxford University Press, 4-42. 
Spierings, Niels. 2014. “The Influence of Islamic Orientations on Democratic Support and 
Tolerance in Five Arab Countries.” Politics and Religion 7(04): 706–33. 
Stepan, Alfred. 2000. “Religion, Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations".” Journal of Democracy 
11: 37-57. 
Tausanovitch, Chris and Christopher Warshaw. 2013. “Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences 
in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities.” Journal of Politics 75(2): 330-342. 
Tessler, Mark. 2002. “Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious  
Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy.” Comparative Politics 34(3): 337-354. 
Tessler, Mark. 2003. “Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes and Evidence from Survey 
Research.” International Studies Perspective 4: 175-181. 
Tetlock, Philip E. 1986. “A Value Pluralism Model of Ideological Reasoning.” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 50(4):819-827. 
Treier, Shawn and Simon Jackman. 2008. “Democracy as a Latent Variable.” American Journal 
of Political Science 51(1): 201-217. 
41 
 
Treier, Shawn and D. Sunshine Hillygus. 2009. “The Nature of Political Ideology in the 
Contemporary Electorate.” Public Opinion Quarterly 73(4): 679-703. 
Verkuyten, Maykel, Mieke Maliepaard, Borja Martinovic, and Yassine Khoudja. 2014. “Political 
Tolerance among Muslim Minorities in Western Europe: The Role of Denomination and 
Religious and Host National Identification.” Politics and Religion 7(March): 1–22. 
Wald, Kenneth D., Adam Silverman, and Kevin Fridy. 2005. “Making Sense of Religion in 
Political Life.” Annual Review of Political Science 8: 121-141. 
Ysseldyk, Renate, Kimberly Matheson, and Hymie Anisman. 2010. “Religiosity as Identity: 
Toward an Understanding of Religion from a Social Identity Perspective.” Personality and 
Social Psychology Review 14: 60-71. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 1. Illustration of a Common Space 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Respondent A • •    
Respondent B  • •   
Respondent C   •   
Respondent D    • • 
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Table 2. List of Questions and Amount of Explained Variance 
Questions List8 
𝑹𝟐 (%) 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
Q92d. Stoning people who commit adultery 75.9% 0.1% 3.5% 3.6% 9.4% 
Q92c. Cutting hands for thieves 70.9% 0.0% 5.5% 2.7% 6.4% 
Q92a. Giving Muslim leaders power to decide family dispute 69.9% 0.9% 1.2% 0.0% 0.4% 
Q79a/Q80. Favor making sharia official law 69.4% 2.3% 2.1% 0.4% 0.2% 
Q92b. Death penalty for people who leave Islam 64.2% 1.5% 0.1% 2.0% 4.6% 
Q52/Q52AFG. Muslims have duty to convert others 36.6% 0.0% 3.3% 2.0% 1.1% 
Q15. Religious leaders should influence political matters 34.7% 0.3% 1.6% 1.7% 0.0% 
Q78. A wife must always obey her husband 33.6% 3.2% 6.6% 0.2% 0.4% 
Q55. Islam is the one true faith leading to heaven 29.7% 2.2% 21.2% 0.1% 4.7% 
Q77. A wife should not have the right to divorce her husband 27.8% 0.7% 5.6% 0.1% 0.1% 
Q58. Women do not have the right to decide whether or not to wear a veil 22.4% 0.9% 2.3% 0.4% 0.0% 
Q68/69. How close laws in country follow sharia and whether bad or good 19.2% 1.3% 3.7% 0.2% 0.0% 
Q84b. Polygamy is morally acceptable 18.8% 0.9% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Q83. Sons should have greater right to parents’ inheritance 18.5% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
Q16. Must believe in God to be moral 15.5% 4.0% 10.8% 0.3% 2.8% 
Q13. Islamic parties better than others 13.9% 0.0% 1.4% 0.8% 0.0% 
Q84f. Suicide is morally unacceptable 1.4% 67.6% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% 
Q84h. Prostitution is morally unacceptable 0.1% 66.7% 0.3% 5.9% 0.4% 
Q84j. Homosexuality is morally unacceptable 0.4% 63.4% 0.8% 8.6% 0.5% 
                                                            
8 Questions with more than one question numbers indicate that they are a combination of several related questions measuring the same 
issue. The reason Pew gave the questions multiple question numbers is because they were asked in different countries with slight wording 
differences. 
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Q84i. Extra-marital sex is morally unacceptable 8.8% 58.1% 4.8% 2.9% 1.4% 
Q84e. Euthanasia is morally unacceptable 0.0% 53.1% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 
Q84g. Abortion is morally unacceptable 0.7% 49.8% 0.6% 0.2% 0.3% 
Q84d. Drinking alcohol is morally unacceptable 8.4% 40.1% 1.7% 0.0% 1.8% 
Q57. There is only one true way to interpret teachings of Islam 0.5% 0.0% 23.6% 0.0% 0.8% 
Q67. Sharia should not be open to multiple interpretations 0.0% 0.1% 17.1% 0.1% 0.2% 
Q53/Q53AIU. Man engaging in premarital sex may be killed 8.6% 0.2% 1.1% 87.2% 0.0% 
Q54/Q54AIU. Woman engaging in premarital sex may be killed 14.1% 0.5% 2.4% 59.8% 0.0% 
Q89. Violence to defend Islam is justified 13.7% 1.2% 0.0% 17.1% 1.1% 
Q38/Q38IRN. Not okay if daughter married a Christian 5.2% 1.7% 9.2% 1.0% 79.0% 
Q37/Q37IRN. Not okay if son married a Christian 1.1% 1.6% 3.9% 0.2% 78.9% 
Q26. Western culture hurts morality 9.4% 2.4% 3.2% 1.8% 4.7% 
Q17. Do not like Western music or culture 8.9% 1.6% 5.7% 2.0% 3.8% 
Q66. Sharia is the revealed word of God 4.7% 0.3% 8.2% 0.2% 0.1% 
Q19. Conflict between science and religion 2.0% 0.0% 3.6% 2.7% 0.1% 
Q24. Islam and Christian/Buddhism do not share similarities 1.8% 0.2% 4.9% 0.0% 3.3% 
Q20. Do not believe evolution 1.5% 0.2% 4.4% 0.1% 0.2% 
Q14. Prefer strong leader to democratic leader 0.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Q84c. Birth control is morally unacceptable 0.3% 9.7% 0.4% 4.8% 0.0% 
Q84a. Divorce is morally unacceptable 0.1% 6.4% 2.8% 3.9% 0.3% 
Q75/Q75IRN. Conflict between being devout and living in modern society 0.0% 0.1% 1.8% 5.3% 0.0% 
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Table 3. Correlations between Conservatisms and Religiosity 
 Islamic 
Conservatism 
General 
Conservatism 
Reading 
Qur’an 
Frequency 
Prayer 
Attending 
Mosque 
Importance 
of Religion 
Islamic  
 
1      
General  .134*** 
N=30,167 
1     
Qur’an .516*** 
N=29,388 
.151*** 
N=29,388 
1    
Prayer .460*** 
N=29624 
.158*** 
N=29,624 
.513*** 
N=28,931 
1   
Mosque .363*** 
N=29,806 
.125*** 
N=29,806 
.391*** 
N=29,091 
.388*** 
N=29,297 
1  
Importance  .452*** 
N=29,898 
.215*** 
N=29,898 
.439*** 
N=29,155 
.441*** 
N=29,382 
.311*** 
N=29,571 
1 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10 
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Table 4. Multilevel Logistic Regressions 
 Model 1: Affirmation 
of Freedom 
Model 2: Opposition 
to Discrimination 
Individual-level Predictors    
Islamic Conservatism -.118*** -.227** 
 (.04) (.10) 
General Conservatism .117*** .224*** 
 (.03) (.08) 
Frequency Praying .017 -.044 
 (.01) (.04) 
Education Level -.020 .056 
 (.04) (.09) 
Age .440** -.219 
 (.18) (.43) 
Female .164*** .390*** 
 (.05) (.12) 
Personal Economic Condition .128*** -.181** 
 (.04) (.08) 
Country Economic Condition .086** -.462*** 
 (.03) (.08) 
Proportion of Muslim Friends -.113*** -.036 
 (.04) (.10) 
Country-Level Predictors   
GDP 2010 -.492 .554 
 (.33) (.47) 
Proportion of Muslims -.313 2.335 
 (1.01) (1.47) 
GRI  -.019 -.160 
 (.07) (.10) 
HDI 2010 5.058 .299 
 (3.17) (4.72) 
Random Effect and Intercept   
Intercept 2.819* -3.431 
 (1.64) (2.36) 
Standard deviation of intercept .581 .774 
 (.10) (.16) 
Observations 18572 1683 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10 . Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Robustness Check 
 Model 1: 
Prefer Strong 
Leader 
Model 2: 
Affirmation 
of Freedom 
Model 3: 
Opposition to 
Discrimination 
Individual-level Predictors     
Islamic Conservatism .112*** -.123*** -.184* 
 (.03) (.04) (.11) 
General Conservatism .06*** .104*** .200** 
 (.02) (.03) (.09) 
Prefer Strong Leader  -.429*** .145 
  (.05) (.12) 
Frequency Praying .005 .016 -.039 
 (.01) (.01) (.04) 
Education Level -.036 -.021 .052 
 (.02) (.04) (.09) 
Age .374*** .441** -.354 
 (.11) (.19) (.46) 
Female .065** .168*** .389*** 
 (.03) (.05) (.12) 
Personal Economic Condition -.116*** .119*** -.205** 
 (.02) (.04) (.09) 
Country Economic Condition -.087*** .083** -.471*** 
 (.02) (.03) (.08) 
Proportion of Muslim Friends -.049* -.130*** -.006 
 (.03) (.04) (.10) 
Country-Level Predictors    
GDP 2010 -.197 -.531 .657 
 (.30) (.34) (.51) 
Proportion of Muslims -.827 -.441 2.250 
 (.92) (1.02) (1.58) 
GRI  .089 -.008 -.121 
 (.06) (.07) (.11) 
HDI 2010 .260 5.300* -.847 
 (2.89) (3.21) (5.05) 
Random Effect and Intercept    
Intercept 1.654 3.282** -3.786 
 (1.49) (1.67) (2.54) 
Standard deviation of intercept .536 .588 .837 
 (.09) (.10) (.17) 
Observations 21084 17655 1564 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10 . Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Discriminating Parameters (𝜷) of Questions in the Islamic Conservatism Model 
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Figure 2. Difficulty Parameters (𝜶) of Questions in the Islamic Conservatism Model 
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Figure 3. Country-level Islamic Conservatism Scores 
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Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Religious Freedom 
 
 
